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AUGMENTED LAGRANGIAN METHODS FOR THE SOLUTION OF
GENERALIZED NASH EQUILIBRIUM PROBLEMS ∗
CHRISTIAN KANZOW † AND DANIEL STECK ‡
Abstract. We propose an augmented Lagrangian-type algorithm for the solution of generalized
Nash equilibrium problems (GNEPs). Specifically, we discuss the convergence properties with regard
to both feasibility and optimality of limit points. This is done by introducing a secondary GNEP
as a new optimality concept. In this context, special consideration is given to the role of suitable
constraint qualifications that take into account the particular structure of GNEPs. Furthermore,
we consider the behaviour of the method for jointly-convex GNEPs and describe a modification
which is tailored towards the computation of variational equilibria. Numerical results are included
to illustrate the practical performance of the overall method.
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1. Introduction. We consider the generalized Nash equilibrium problem which
consists of N players, where each player ν = 1, . . . , N tries to solve his optimization
problem
(1) min
xν
θν(x) s.t. c
ν(x) ≤ 0,
where θν : R
n → R denotes the objective or utility function of player ν, cν : Rn →
R
rν defines the constraints, and the vector x consists of the block components xν ∈
R
nν , ν = 1, . . . , N . These block vectors xν denote the variables of player ν, and
we subsume the remaining blocks into the subvector x−ν , and then sometimes write
x = (xν , x−ν) to indicate the importance of the block vector xν within the whole
vector x. Note that we have n = n1+ . . .+nN ; furthermore, we set r := r1+ . . .+ rN
for the total number of constraints. The GNEP is called player-convex if all functions
θν(·, x−ν) and cνi (·, x−ν) are convex for any given x−ν , whereas the GNEP is called
jointly-convex if, again, the utility functions θν are convex as a mapping of x
ν and
the constraints coincide for all players, i.e. c1 = . . . = cN =: c, and c is convex as a
function of the entire vector x. Note that the GNEP reduces to the standard Nash
equilibrium problem (NEP) in the special case where cν depends on the subvector xν
only.
Using this notation, we recall that x¯ =
(
x¯1, . . . , x¯N
)
is a (generalized) Nash
equilibrium or simply a solution of the GNEP if x¯ satisfies all the constraints and,
in addition, for each player ν = 1, . . . , N , it holds that
θν(x¯) ≤ θν(xν , x¯−ν) ∀xν : cν(xν , x¯−ν) ≤ 0,
i.e., x¯ is a solution if and only if no player ν can improve his situation by unilaterally
changing his strategy.
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Note that we do not include equality constraints in our GNEP simply for the sake
of notational convenience; our subsequent approach can easily be extended to equality
and inequality constraints. Apart from this, the above setting is very general since,
so far, we do not assume any convexity assumptions on the mappings θν and c
ν as
is done in many other GNEP papers where only the player-convex or jointly-convex
case is considered, cf. [2, 8, 7, 10, 12, 17, 28] for more details. It follows that our
framework can, in principle, be applied to very general classes of GNEPs.
In the meantime, there exist a variety of methods for the solution of GNEPs,
though most of them are designed for player- or jointly-convex GNEPs and therefore
do not cover the GNEP in its full generality. We refer the interested reader once
again to the two survey papers [12, 17] and the references therein for a quite complete
overview of the existing approaches. One of the main problems when solving a GNEP
is an inherent singularity property that arises when some players share the same
constraints, see [11] for more details. Hence, second-order methods with fast local
convergence are difficult to design. This also motivates us to consider methods which
may not be locally superlinearly or quadratically convergent, but have nice global
convergence properties.
Penalty-type schemes belong to this class of methods. The first penalty method
for GNEPs that we are aware of is due to Fukushima [18]. A related penalty algorithm
was also proposed in [13], and a modification of this algorithm is described in [14]
where only some of the constraints are penalized. While all these approaches prove
exactness results under suitable assumptions, they suffer from the drawback that
the resulting penalized subproblems are nonsmooth Nash equilibrium problems and
therefore difficult to solve numerically.
Taking this into account, it is natural to apply an augmented Lagrangian-type
approach in order to solve GNEPs because the resulting subproblems then have a
higher degree of smoothness and should therefore be easier to solve. This idea is not
completely new since Pang and Fukushima [22] applied this idea to quasi-variational
inequalities (QVIs). An improved version of that method can be found in [20], also
for QVIs. Since the GNEP is a special instance of a QVI, these two papers also
discuss the GNEP within their general QVI-framework. Here, we apply the augmented
Lagrangian idea directly to GNEPs. It turns out that the corresponding results are
significantly stronger than or simply different from those that arise from the QVI-
framework in [20, 22]. In particular, no GNEP-tailored constraint qualifications are
considered in [20, 22], and the feasibility issue, which plays a central role in this paper,
is not discussed there as a separate topic.
Recall that the augmented Lagrangian (or multiplier-penalty) method is one of the
traditional methods for the solution of constrained optimization problems [3, 21] which
have also been the subject of some recent research with several improved convergence
results, see, e.g., [4] and references therein. We therefore try to adapt these recent
improvements to GNEPs in order to get a better understanding of the augmented
Lagrangian approach applied to GNEPs. It turns out, however, that some results are
different from those that are known for standard optimization problems.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we deal with GNEP-tailored
constraint qualifications (CQs), prove some basic results and present an error bound as
an application. Section 3 contains a precise statement of our algorithm; starting with
that section, we divide the constraint functions cν into two parts and penalize only
one of these two parts within our (partial) augmented Lagrangian approach. Hence,
we consider a whole class of methods which is quite flexible and can take into account
the special structure of the underlying GNEP in a very favourable way. Section 4 is
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then dedicated to a thorough convergence analysis. To this end, we consider both the
feasibility and optimality of limit points of our algorithm; in particular, we introduce a
secondary GNEP called Feasibility GNEP as a new optimality concept for generalized
Nash games which may be viewed as an interesting counterpart of a feasibility result
for limit points in the optimization framework, see [4]. In Section 5, we describe how
to modify our algorithm in a way that is tailored to the computation of variational
equilibria for jointly-convex GNEPs, and state corresponding convergence theorems.
Section 6 presents some numerical results, and we conclude with some final remarks
in Section 7.
Notation: Given a function f = f(x) of suitable dimension, we denote by ∇f
the transposed Jacobian of f . If xν is a given subvector of x, then ∇xνf denotes
the submatrix of ∇f which corresponds to the components xν . Furthermore, given
a scalar α, we write α+ for max{0, α}. Similarly, given a vector v, we write v+ for
the vector where the plus-operator is applied component-wise. When dealing with a
function, we occasionally also write f+(x) = (f(x))+. All vector norms without an
index are Euclidean norms; the induced matrix norm is denoted by the same symbol.
2. GNEP Constraint Qualifications. This section is dedicated to an analysis
of constraint qualifications for GNEPs and their properties. Before we do so, we first
recall the definition of a KKT point.
Definition 1. A pair (x, λ) ∈ Rn+r is called a KKT point of the GNEP (1) if
∇xνθν(x) +∇xν cν(x)λν = 0 and min{−cν(x), λν} = 0
for every ν. We call x a KKT point if (x, λ) is a KKT point for some λ ∈ Rm.
Note that min{−cν(x), λν} = 0 is equivalent to cν(x) ≤ 0, λν ≥ 0 and cν(x)Tλν = 0.
In the theory of augmented Lagrangian methods for optimization problems, two
constraint qualifications have proven to be particularly important: the (extended)
Mangasarian-Fromovitz constraint qualification and the constant positive linear de-
pendence condition (see [4, 24]). Here, we present suitable extensions of these condi-
tions to the GNEP setting.
2.1. Constraint Qualifications. Recall that we have a GNEP of the form
(1). The first condition we present is a GNEP-tailored version of CPLD. Note that
we call a collection of vectors v1, . . . , vk positively linearly dependent if the system
λ1v1 + . . . + λkvk = 0, λi ≥ 0, has a nontrivial solution. Otherwise, the vectors are
called positively linearly independent.
Definition 2. Consider a GNEP of the form (1). Let ν be a given index and
x ∈ Rn be a given point with cν(x) ≤ 0. We say that cν satisfies CPLD with respect
to player ν or simply CPLDν if, whenever the partial gradients ∇xν cνi (x) (i ∈ I) are
positively linearly dependent for some subset I ⊂ {i ∈ {1, . . . , rν} | cνi (x) = 0}, the
same gradients are linearly dependent in a neighbourhood of x. Moreover, we say that
the GNEP (1) satisfies GNEP-CPLD in x if, for every ν ∈ {1, . . . , N}, the function
cν satisfies CPLDν in x.
In the simplest case N = 1 (i.e. there is only one player), the above reduces to the
classical CPLD, cf. [24]. Hence, one might consider GNEP-CPLD as a straightfor-
ward generalization of CPLD to the multi-player setting. However, there are some
peculiarities that need to be pointed out. Clearly, the above condition only makes an
assertion about the partial gradients with regard to the respective player’s variable
xν . However, we require that the positive linear dependence (if there is one) extends
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to a whole neighbourhood of x. This makes Definition 2 a condition which should not
be attributed to each player ν but rather to the GNEP as a whole.
We now define an analogue of the extended MFCQ. Here, we do not require the
point x to be feasible, hence the term extended MFCQ.
Definition 3. Consider a GNEP of the form (1). Let ν be a given index and
x ∈ Rn be a given point. We say that cν satisfies EMFCQ with respect to player ν
or simply EMFCQν if there is a vector d
ν ∈ Rnν such that
cνi (x) ≥ 0 =⇒ ∇xν cνi (x)T dν < 0
holds for every i ∈ {1, . . . , rν}. Moreover, we say that the GNEP (1) satisfies GNEP-
EMFCQ in x if, for every ν ∈ {1, . . . , N}, the function cν satisfies EMFCQν in x.
While GNEP-CPLD seems to be a new constraint qualification for GNEPs, the GNEP-
EMFCQ condition is already used in [13, 18] to prove exactness results for suitable
penalty methods; apart from this, these references do not contain any further discus-
sion of GNEP-EMFCQ. Since both constraint qualifications play a central role in our
subsequent analysis, we therefore discuss their main properties in this section.
To this end, first note that EMFCQ boils down to the classical MFCQ condition in
case of feasible points x. Hence, when dealing with feasible points, we will sometimes
simply write GNEP-MFCQ instead of GNEP-EMFCQ. By use of a classical theo-
rem of the alternative, it is easy to see that Definition 3 can equivalently be stated
as the gradients ∇xνcνi (x) (cνi (x) ≥ 0) being positively linearly independent. This
immediately shows that GNEP-MFCQ (for feasible points) implies GNEP-CPLD.
Clearly, the above two CQs are conditions which are tailored to GNEPs. However,
it is not immediately clear whether there is a relationship between the ”classical”
constraint qualifications and their GNEP counterparts. In fact, one could simply
concatenate the player constraints cν into one mapping
(2) c(x) =

 c
1(x)
...
cN (x)


and ask whether we can reduce GNEP constraint qualifications to conditions for this
function. In general, however, this is not possible. To this end, consider the following
set of examples.
Example 4. In both examples, we have two players ν = 1, 2 with n1 = n2 := 1,
and the mapping c is defined by (2) with r1 = r2 := 1. To simplify the notation, we
write c1 and c2 instead of c
1
1 and c
2
1, respectively, for the two components of c.
(a) Consider the function
c(x1, x2) =
(
x1
x1 + x
2
2
)
and the point x¯ = (0, 0). Using d = (−1, 0), it follows that ∇c1(x¯)T d < 0 and
∇c2(x¯)T d < 0. Hence, standard EMFCQ holds for this constraint. However,
we have ∇x2c2(x¯) = 0, which means that EMFCQ2 cannot hold. In fact, even
CPLD2 is not satisfied since ∇x2c2(x) = 2x2 for all x ∈ R2.
(b) Consider the function
c(x1, x2) =
(
2x1 − x22 − 1
2x2 − x21 − 1
)
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and the point x¯ = (1, 1). Due to ∇x1c1(x) = ∇x2c2(x) = 2, it is clear that
GNEP-EMFCQ holds in x¯. On the other hand, the gradients of c are given
by
∇c1(x) =
(
2
−2x2
)
, ∇c2(x) =
(−2x1
2
)
.
This shows that c satisfies neither EMFCQ nor CPLD in x¯.
These examples show that, in general, the classical CPLD and EMFCQ are entirely
different conditions in comparison to their GNEP counterparts. There is, however,
an important special case which arises if the functions cν depend on xν only, so we
have a standard NEP. In this case, the transposed Jacobian ∇c(x) is a block diagonal
matrix of the form
(3) ∇c(x) =

∇x
1c1(x1)
. . .
∇xN cN (xN )

 with ∇xν cν(xν) ∈ Rnν×rν .
This makes it easy to prove that GNEP-CPLD is equivalent to CPLD (for the function
c), and the same holds with CPLD replaced by EMFCQ.
Theorem 5. Consider a standard NEP of the form (1) with C1-functions θν and
cν . If x¯ ∈ Rn is a given point, then the following assertions are true:
(a) If x¯ is feasible, then GNEP-CPLD holds in x¯ iff c satisfies CPLD in x¯.
(b) GNEP-EMFCQ holds in x¯ iff c satisfies EMFCQ in x¯.
Proof. The proof is based on (3) and is rather straightforward.
We now prove two theorems which establish the role of GNEP-CPLD and GNEP-
EMFCQ as constraint qualifications. These theorems play a fundamental role in our
analysis and will be referenced multiple times later on. It should be noted, however,
that the proofs are obtained by suitable adaptations of the corresponding proofs for
classical optimization problems.
Theorem 6. Consider a GNEP of the form (1) where θν and c
ν are C1-functions.
Let (xk) ⊂ Rn be a sequence converging to x¯ and (λν,k) ⊂ Rrν be vectors with
(4) ∇xνθν(xk) +∇xν cν(xk)λν,k → 0 and min{−cν(xk), λν,k} → 0
for every ν. If GNEP-CPLD holds in x¯, then x¯ together with some multiplier λ¯ is a
KKT point of the GNEP.
Proof. Let ν ∈ {1, . . . , N}. Since the relations (4) remain true if we replace λν,k by
λν,k+ , we may assume, without loss of generality, that λ
ν,k ≥ 0 for all k. Furthermore,
we have λν,ki → 0 for every i with cνi (x¯) < 0. Hence, we get
∇xνθν(xk) +
∑
cν
i
(x¯)=0
λν,ki ∇xν cνi (xk)→ 0.
Using a Carathe´odory-type result, cf. [4, Lem. 3.1], we can choose subsets
Iν,k ⊂ {i | cνi (x¯) = 0}
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such that the gradients∇xν ci(xk) (i ∈ Iν,k) are linearly independent and we can write∑
cν
i
(x¯)=0
λν,ki ∇xνcνi (xk) =
∑
i∈Iν,k
λˆν,ki ∇xνcνi (xk)
for some vectors λˆν,k ≥ 0. Subsequencing if necessary, we may assume that Iν,k = Iν
for every k, i.e. we get
(5) ∇xνθν(xk) +
∑
i∈Iν
λˆν,ki ∇xνcνi (xk)→ 0.
We claim that the sequence (λˆν,k) is bounded. If this is not the case, then we can
divide both sides of the above equation by ‖λˆν,k‖, take the limit k → ∞ on a suit-
able subsequence and obtain a nontrivial positive linear combination of the gradients
∇xν ci(x¯), i ∈ Iν , which vanishes. Hence, by CPLD, these gradients should be linearly
dependent in a neighbourhood of x¯, which is a contradiction.
Hence (λˆν,k) is bounded; let λ¯νi (i ∈ Iν) be a limit point. Setting λ¯νi := 0 for all
i 6∈ Iν , and taking into account (5), it follows that x¯ together with the multiplier λ¯ν
satisfies the KKT conditions of player ν. Since ν ∈ {1, . . . , N} was chosen arbitrarily,
the statement follows.
Note that assumption (4) means that xk, together with some multiplier estimate λν,k,
satisfies the KKT conditions of player ν inexactly. In contrast to the approximate
KKT conditions used in [4] (also applied in [20]), however, we do not assume that
the multiplier estimates are nonnegative which gives some more freedom in our choice
of methods for computing approximate KKT points. Furthermore, let us mention
explicitly that (4) automatically implies that any limit point of the sequence (xk) is
at least feasible for the GNEP (1).
We also stress that, as is usually the case with CPLD-type conditions, the ν-th
component of the vector λ¯ is not necessarily a limit point of the sequence (λν,k). This
property is, in general, only true if we assume a stronger constraint qualification.
To this end, consider the following theorem which uses GNEP-MFCQ (recall the
feasibility of the limit points, hence there is no need to assume GNEP-EMFCQ).
Theorem 7. Consider a GNEP of the form (1) where θν and c
ν are C1-functions.
Let (xk) ⊂ Rn be a sequence converging to x¯ and (λν,k) ⊂ Rrν be vectors such that
(4) holds for every ν. If GNEP-MFCQ holds in x¯, then the sequences (λν,k) are
bounded. Moreover, if λ¯ν is a limit point of (λν,k) for every ν, then x¯ together with
λ¯ = (λ¯1, . . . , λ¯N ) is a KKT point of the GNEP.
Proof. Clearly, it suffices to show the boundedness. To this end, let ν ∈ {1, . . . , N}
be an arbitrary player. By assumption, we have λν,ki → 0 for every i with cνi (x¯) < 0.
Hence, recalling that x¯ is feasible by (4), we get
∇xνθν(xk) +
∑
cν
i
(x¯)=0
λν,ki ∇xν cνi (xk)→ 0.
Assume now, by contradiction, that ‖λν,k‖ → ∞. Dividing the above equation by
‖λν,k‖, we obtain
∑
cν
i
(x¯)=0
αν,ki ∇xνcνi (xk)→ 0, where αν,k =
λν,k
‖λν,k‖ .
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Obviously, (αν,k) is bounded and has a limit point αν with αν ≥ 0 and ‖αν‖ = 1.
Hence, we obtain ∑
cν
i
(x¯)=0
ανi∇xνcνi (x¯) = 0,
which contradicts GNEP-MFCQ.
The previous results indicate that GNEP-MFCQ is a more practical property than
GNEP-CPLD, because it allows us to explicitly construct the multipliers which make
x¯ a KKT point. However, when dealing with approximate KKT conditions of the
type
(6) ∇xνθν(xk) +∇xν cν(xk)λν,k → 0
we will typically use an inexact stopping criterion. That is, we stop the iteration as
soon as the left-hand side of the above equation is sufficiently close to zero, regardless
of whether λν,k is close to a multiplier λ¯ν which satisfies ∇xνθν(x¯) +∇xν cν(x¯)λ¯ν = 0.
It is a peculiarity of GNEP-CPLD that the sequence of multipliers can be unbounded,
but we still have the approximate KKT condition (6).
2.2. An Error Bound Result. There exist different types of error bounds in
the optimization literature. One class of error bounds provides a computable estimate
for the distance of a given point to the solution set or the set of KKT points, the other
class provides a measure for the distance to the feasible set. For GNEPs, there exist
some error bound results of the former type, see the papers [6, 19], whereas here we
use our GNEP constraint qualifications to show that they can be used to obtain an
error bound of the latter type.
To this end, consider a GNEP of the form (1) where cν is the constraint function
of player ν. It will be convenient to define the sets
Xν(x
−ν) = {xν ∈ Rnν | cν(xν , x−ν) ≤ 0}.
It is well known that, for classical optimization problems, the CPLD constraint quali-
fication implies a local error bound on the feasible set, see [1]. This result can readily
be applied to GNEPs if we consider the concatenated constraint function c from (2).
This yields an error bound on the distance to the set
X = {x ∈ Rn | c(x) ≤ 0},
i.e. the set of points which are feasible for every player. However, this set is not
natural to GNEPs since it does not preserve the structure of the players’ individual
optimization problems. Furthermore, we cannot expect such an error bound to hold
without additional requirements on the partial gradients ∇xµcν(x), µ 6= ν, of player
ν’s constraint function with respect to another player µ. Hence, it is more natural to
ask for player-specific error bounds of the form
(7) dist(xν , Xν(x
−ν)) ≤ C‖cν+(x)‖,
which measure the distance of xν to the corresponding setXν(x
−ν). Special care needs
to be taken because the set Xν(x
−ν) could be empty. In fact, this latter point is where
the theory of GNEP error bounds is substantially different from the corresponding
theory for classical optimization problems. To see this, consider a point x and a player
ν such that xν is on the boundary of Xν(x
−ν). Two questions need to be considered:
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xy
(ε, y¯)
X2(ε) = ∅
x
y
(1, ε)X1(ε)
Figure 1. Illustration of Example 2.7(a) (left) and (b) (right).
• Is there a neighbourhood U of x such that the set Xν(y−ν) is nonempty for
every y ∈ U?
• If yk is a sequence of points converging to x, does the sequence of distances
dk = dist(yν,k, Xν(y
−ν,k)) converge to zero?
It is particularly the second question which poses significant difficulties to our analysis.
In fact, a consequence of these problems is that GNEP-CPLD is not strong enough
to imply a partial error bound.
Example 8. (a) Consider a jointly-convex GNEP with two players, each con-
trolling a single variable. For simplicity, we denote the variables by x and
y. The constraint function is given by c1(x, y) = c2(x, y) = x. Clearly,
GNEP-CPLD holds at every feasible point, because the constraints are lin-
ear. However, given any point (0, y¯) on the boundary of the feasible region
and a neighbourhood U , there are points (x, y) ∈ U such that X2(x) is empty.
For instance, we can simply choose (x, y) = (ε, y¯) for any ε > 0, cf. Figure 1
(left).
(b) Consider another GNEP with two players, each controlling a single variable.
Like above, we write x and y. Let player 1’s (smooth!) constraint function be
given by c1(x, y) = y−min{0, x}2. Consider the feasible point (x¯, y¯) = (1, 0).
The function c1 is linear in a neighbourhood of (x¯, y¯), which implies that
GNEP-CPLD holds. Furthermore, unlike with example (a), the set X1(y) is
nonempty for every (x, y) in a neighbourhood of (x¯, y¯). Despite this, an error
bound does not hold because, given any point (x, y) = (1, ε) with ε > 0, it
holds that dist(x,X1(y)) = 1 +
√
ε, cf. Figure 1 (right).
Despite this negative result, it turns out that GNEP-MFCQ does imply an error
bound. In order to show this, we first prove a technical lemma.
Lemma 9. For a GNEP of the form (1), let ν be a given index, let x be a given
point with cν(x) ≤ 0 and assume that cν satisfies MFCQν in x. Then we have the
following properties:
(a) There is a neighbourhood U of x such that, for every y ∈ U , the set Xν(y−ν)
is nonempty.
(b) Given ε > 0, we can choose a neighbourhood U of x such that, for every
y ∈ U , there is a point zν ∈ Xν(y−ν) with ‖zν − yν‖ ≤ ε.
Proof. Since statement (b) implies (a), it suffices to show assertion (b). To this
end, let ε > 0 be a positive number. By MFCQν , there is a vector d
ν ∈ Rnν such
that ∇xν cνi (x)T dν < 0 holds for every i with cνi (x) = 0. By the mean value theorem
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and the continuity of cν , this implies that, for sufficiently small t > 0, the point xt =
(xν+tdν , x−ν) is strictly feasible for player ν, i.e. cνi (x
t) < 0 for all i = 1, . . . , rν and all
t > 0 sufficiently small. We then choose t > 0 small enough so that ‖xt−x‖ ≤ ε/2 and,
subsequently, a radius r > 0 such that the (full-dimensional) neighbourhood Br(xt)
consists of feasible points for player ν; note that the latter exists by the continuity
of cν and the strict feasibility of xt for player ν. Now, set r
′ = min{r, ε/2} and
U = Br′(x). We claim that this set U has the desired properties. In fact, take an
arbitrary element y ∈ U , and define zν := xν + tdν . Then we have (zν , y−ν) ∈ Br(xt)
and hence zν ∈ Xν(y−ν). Furthermore, ‖xν − yν‖ ≤ ‖x − y‖ ≤ r′ ≤ ε/2 and
‖zν−xν‖ = ‖tdν‖ = ‖xt−x‖ ≤ ε/2, hence the triangle inequality implies ‖zν−yν‖ ≤
‖zν − xν‖+ ‖xν − yν‖ ≤ ε. This completes the proof.
The above lemma guarantees that, for y in a vicinity of a given point x, the projection
of yν onto the feasible set Xν(y
−ν) is sufficiently well-behaved. Roughly speaking, if
y is close to x, then there is a feasible point (zν , y−ν) which is close to y (and hence,
close to x). Note that, in view of the previous examples, GNEP-CPLD is not enough
to even imply part (a) of the lemma.
Theorem 10. For a GNEP of the form (1), let ν be a given index and x be a
given point with cν(x) ≤ 0. Assume that cν satisfies MFCQν in x and ∇xνcν is
Lipschitz-continuous in a neighbourhood of x. Then there is a constant C > 0 and a
neighbourhood U of x such that, for every y ∈ U , we have the error bound (7).
Proof. By Lemma 9 (a), there is a neighbourhood U˜ of x such that, for every
y ∈ U˜ , the set Xν(y−ν) is nonempty. By the local Lipschitz continuity of ∇xν cν , we
can choose U˜ small enough so that there is a constant C1 > 0 with
(8) cνi (z) +∇zν cνi (z)T (yν − zν) ≤ cνi (y) + C1‖zν − yν‖2
for every i = 1, . . . , rν and y, z ∈ U˜ with y−ν = z−ν. Now, let y ∈ U˜ be an infeasible
point for player ν (for feasible points, there is nothing to prove), and let zν = zν(y)
be a projection of yν onto the (nonempty and closed, but not necessarily convex) set
Xν(y
−ν), i.e. zν is a solution of the optimization problem
(9) min ‖ξν − yν‖ s.t. cν(ξν , y−ν) ≤ 0.
For brevity, we write z = (zν, y−ν). Since MFCQν holds at x, this condition also
holds in a neighbourhood of x. Taking into account Lemma 9 (b), it follows that the
point z is arbitrarily close to y. Hence, without loss of generality, we can assume that
MFCQν holds at z. It then follows that z
ν satisfies the KKT condition
zν − yν
‖zν − yν‖ +∇zν c
ν(z)λν = 0
of the optimization problem (9), where λν = λν(y) ∈ Rrν denotes a corresponding
(nonnegative) Lagrange multiplier. Premultiplying this equation by (zν − yν)T yields
‖zν − yν‖ = (λν)T∇zν cν(z)T (yν − zν) ≤
∑
i∈Iν
λνi∇zν cνi (z)T (yν − zν),
where Iν = Iν(y) is the set of indices for which the corresponding term in the sum is
positive. Since λνi ≥ 0 for all i = 1, . . . , rν , this implies λνi > 0 and ∇zν cνi (z)T (yν −
zν) > 0 for all i ∈ Iν . In particular, we have cνi (z) = 0 for every i ∈ Iν . Furthermore,
Theorem 7 implies the existence of a constant C2 > 0 such that ‖λν(y)‖ ≤ C2 for
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every y ∈ U˜ . We now apply Lemma 9 (b) with ε = (2rνC1C2)−1 and obtain a
neighbourhood U ⊂ U˜ of x with ‖zν(y)− yν‖ ≤ ε for every y ∈ U . It follows that
‖zν − yν‖ ≤
∑
i∈Iν
λνi︸︷︷︸
≤C2
∇zν cνi (z)T
(
yν − zν)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
≤ C2
∑
i∈Iν
(
cνi (z)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
+∇zν cνi (z)T
(
yν − zν))
(8)
≤ C2
∑
i∈Iν
(
cνi (y) + C1‖zν − yν‖2
)
≤ C2
∑
i∈Iν
cνi (y) + C1C2rν‖zν − yν‖2
and hence
‖zν − yν‖ − rνC1C2‖zν − yν‖2 ≤ C2
∑
i∈Iν
cνi (y) ≤ C2‖cν+(y)‖1
for every y ∈ U . This implies the desired error bound, since
‖zν − yν‖ − rνC1C2‖zν − yν‖2 ≥ 1
2
‖zν − yν‖
by the definition of ε.
The above theorem establishes player-individual error bounds for GNEPs which satisfy
GNEP-MFCQ. Note that this does not imply an error bound to the set X of points
which are feasible for the GNEP as a whole. In fact, the latter set could be empty
and Theorem 10 still holds.
3. An Augmented Lagrangian Method. This section describes an augmented
Lagrangian method for GNEPs. Due to the nature of our penalization scheme, we
have decided to adjust the notation in a manner that accounts for the possibility of
partial penalization. To this end, we replace the constraint functions cν from (1) by
pairs of functions
cν =
(
gν
hν
)
with gν : Rn → Rmν , hν : Rn → Rpν (i.e. rν = mν + pν)
both of which are assumed to be at least continuously differentiable. Similarly to the
previous notation, we write
m := m1 + . . .+mN , p := p1 + . . .+ pN
and consider a GNEP where player ν has to solve the optimization problem
(10) min
xν
θν(x) s.t. g
ν(x) ≤ 0, hν(x) ≤ 0.
In principle, this is exactly the same problem as (1). However, the two functions gν
and hν play completely different roles in our method. More precisely, gν describes
the set of constraints which we will penalize, whereas hν is an (optional) constraint
function which will stay as a constraint in the penalized subproblems. We stress that
this framework is very general and gives us some flexibility to deal with different
situations. The most natural choices are probably the following ones:
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1. Penalize all contraints. This full penalization approach is probably the sim-
plest and most straightforward approach where, formally, we set pν = 0 for
every player. The resulting subproblems are unconstrained NEPs and are
therefore, in principle, simple to solve. Note that, since we use an augmented
Lagrangian method, these subproblems are still smooth in contrast to the
(exact) penalty schemes investigated in [13, 18].
2. Another natural splitting is the case where hν covers all constraints that
depend on xν only, whereas gν subsumes the remaining constraints. The
resulting penalized problems then become standard (constrained) NEPs and
are therefore easier to solve than the given GNEP since the (presumably)
difficult constraints are moved to the objective function.
3. Finally, the functions hν might, in addition to those constraints depending
on xν only, also contain some constraints that depend on the whole vector
x, like some joint constraints for all players. The advantages is that these
constraints might yield a compact feasible set, so this approach might be
useful to guarantee the solvability of the resulting subproblems. The latter
are, in general, more complicated in this case, but might still be easier than
the original GNEP, for example, in the particular case where the penalized
subproblem becomes a jointly-convex GNEP.
In any case, from now on, we consider GNEPs where player ν has to solve problems of
the form (10) (recall that hν might not exist). Since we perform a partial penalization
of (10), we obtain a penalized GNEP where each player ν has to solve the optimization
problem
(11) min
xν
Lνa(x, u
ν ; ρν) s.t. h
ν(x) ≤ 0
for some parameters uν and ρν which will typically vary in each iteration. The function
Lνa is the augmented Lagrangian of player ν. A typical choice is
Lνa(x, u; ρ) = θν(x) +
ρ
2
∥∥∥∥∥
(
gν(x) +
u
ρ
)
+
∥∥∥∥∥
2
,
which is the classical Powell-Hestenes-Rockafellar augmented Lagrangian (see [26]) of
the optimization problem
min
xν
θν(x) s.t. g
ν(x) ≤ 0.
Note that multiple variants of Lνa exist in the literature.
We proceed by stating our algorithmic framework. Whenever there is a sequence
such as (λk) which consists of components for each player, we will indicate the se-
quences of each player by (λν,k). That is, we have λk =
(
λ1,k, . . . , λN,k
)
. We use this
notation whenever applicable.
Algorithm 11. (Augmented Lagrangian method for GNEPs)
(S.0) Choose (x0, λ0, µ0) ∈ Rn+m+p. Let umax ≥ 0, τν ∈ (0, 1), γν > 1, ρν,0 > 0
for all ν = 1, . . . , N , and set k := 0.
(S.1) If (xk, λk, µk) is an approximate KKT point of the GNEP: STOP.
(S.2) Compute an approximate KKT point (to be defined below) (xk+1, µk+1) of the
GNEP consisting of the minimization problems
(12) min
xν
Lνa(x, u
ν,k; ρν,k) s.t. h
ν(x) ≤ 0
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for each player ν = 1, . . . , N .
(S.3) For ν = 1, . . . , N , update the vector of multipliers to
(13) λν,k+1 =
(
uν,k + ρν,kg
ν(xk+1)
)
+
.
(S.4) For all ν = 1, . . . , N , if
(14)
∥∥min{−gν(xk+1), λν,k+1}∥∥ ≤ τν∥∥min{−gν(xk), λν,k}∥∥,
then set ρν,k+1 := ρν,k. Else, set ρν,k+1 := γνρν,k.
(S.5) Set uk+1 = min{λk+1, umax}, k ← k + 1, and go to (S.1).
Some comments are due. First among them is the fact that the objective functions
in (12) are continuously differentiable, and their gradients are given by
∇Lνa(x, u; ρ) = ∇θν(x) +∇gν(x) (u+ ρgν(x))+ ;
a similar expression holds for the partial gradients with respect to xν . Note that
Lνa is, in general, not twice differentiable even if all functions involved in our GNEP
from (10) are twice continuously differentiable, however, the above expression of the
gradient clearly shows that the gradient of Lνa is still (strongly) semismooth, see, e.g.,
[15] for more details.
Secondly, it should be noted that the sequence (uk) plays an essential role in the
algorithm. Due to the formula in Step 5, it is natural to think of uk as a safeguarded
analogue of λk. In fact, the boundedness of (uk) is the single property which is most
important to our convergence theory. Furthermore, note that the algorithm reduces
to a standard quadratic penalty method if we set umax = 0. In practice, however, it is
much more desirable to set umax to some fixed large value; we will revisit this matter
when discussing the numerical results in Section 6.
Our third comment is a practical one. Clearly, the main cost for a single iteration
of Algorithm 11 lies in Step 2, where we have to (approximately) solve a penalized
GNEP. Hence, the overall feasibility of the method crucially depends on the solution of
these subproblems. In an ideal scenario, we are able to compute approximate solutions
for the penalized GNEPs relatively cheaply. However, we are yet to specify what we
mean by ”approximate solutions”. To this end, consider the following assumption.
Assumption 12. At Step 2 of Algorithm 11, we obtain (xk+1, µk+1) ∈ Rn+p with∥∥∇xνLνa(xk+1, uν,k; ρν,k) +∇xνhν(xk+1)µν,k+1∥∥ ≤ εk
‖min{−hν(xk+1), µν,k+1}‖ ≤ ε′k
for every ν. Here, (εk) ⊂ R+ is bounded and (ε′k) ⊂ R+ tends to zero.
Of course, when dealing with optimality theorems, we will make the additional as-
sumption that εk → 0.
At first glance, it seems that Assumption 12 is nothing but an approximate KKT
condition for the subproblem given by (12). However, we do not require the multipliers
µν,k to be nonnegative. This is because the second condition already implies that
lim infk→∞ µ
ν,k ≥ 0 for every ν, where the limit is understood component-wise. In
other words, every limit point of the sequence (µν,k) must be nonnegative, but the
values µν,k themselves are allowed to be negative. This has the benefit that, when
computing approximate solutions of (12), we allow the solutions to be inexact even
in the sense that the multipliers could become negative. From a practical point of
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view, this difference plays some role because it allows, for example, the application of
semismooth Newton-type methods for the inexact solution of the resulting penalized
subproblems (which, in general, do not guarantee the nonnegativity of the multiplier
estimates).
Let us also stress that we do not assume that we solve (or approximately solve) the
penalized subproblems in (S.4), only (approximate) KKT points are required. This is
of particular importance since, in principle, our method should be able to deal with
nonconvex problems, i.e. with GNEPs which, in general, are neither player-convex
nor jointly-convex. Of course, this general setting does not allow us to get solutions
of the original GNEP, but the subsequent convergence theory still shows that we get
something useful as limit points.
As a final note, it is evident that Assumption 12 can be simplified in the case of
full penalization. Here, we can equivalently state the assumption as∥∥∇xνLνa(xk+1, uν,k; ρν,k)∥∥ ≤ εk
and omit the auxiliary parameters µν,k and ε′k.
4. Convergence Analysis. We proceed with a thorough convergence analysis
for Algorithm 11. The analysis is split into two parts: one which deals with the
feasibility of limit points and one which deals with optimality. Throughout this section,
we will implicitly assume that the method generates an infinite sequence (xk), i.e. the
stopping criterion in Step 1 of Algorithm 11 is never satisfied.
4.1. Feasibility. A central question in all penalty- and augmented Lagrangian-
type schemes is the feasibility of limit points. This problem also arises for standard
optimization problems. Due to some recent results in this area, see [4] and references
therein, it turns out that augmented Lagrangian methods have a very favourable
property regarding feasibility, namely that, under mild conditions, every limit point
has a minimizing property with respect to the constraint violation.
Here we try to find a counterpart of this result for GNEPs that will also play a
central role within our subsequent optimality results. It turns out that this counter-
part is a secondary GNEP defined by the constraint functions gν and hν alone, where
player ν has to solve the optimization problem
(15) min
xν
‖gν+(x)‖2 s.t. hν(x) ≤ 0.
We will refer to this problem as the Feasibility GNEP since it describes the best we can
expect regarding the feasibility of the limit points: player ν minimizes the violation
of the penalized constraints given by gν (with respect to his own variables xν) under
the non-penalized constraints described by hν .
We will now see that the behaviour of Algorithm 11 crucially depends on the
structure of this auxiliary problem. More precisely, under certain assumptions, every
limit point of our algorithm is a solution of the Feasibility GNEP.
Lemma 13. Let (xk) be generated by Algorithm 11 under Assumption 12 and let
x¯ be a limit point of (xk+1)K for some K ⊂ N. Then there are multipliers (µˆk+1),
k ∈ K, such that the approximate KKT conditions
∇xν‖gν+(xk+1)‖2 +∇xνhν(xk+1)µˆν,k+1 →K 0(16)
min{−hν(xk+1), µˆν,k+1} →K 0
of (15) hold for every ν.
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Proof. Let ν ∈ {1, . . . , N}. Clearly, Assumption 12 implies that hν(x) ≤ 0. If the
sequence (ρν,k) is bounded, (14) implies g
ν(x) ≤ 0. Hence, in this case, (16) follows
by simply setting µˆν,k+1 := 0. Assume now that (ρν,k) is unbounded. For k ∈ K,
consider the sequence (µν,k+1) from Assumption 12 and define
αk = ∇xνθν(xk+1) +∇xνgν(xk+1)(uν,k + ρν,kgν(xk+1))+ +∇xνhν(xk+1)µν,k+1.
By Assumption 12, (αk) is bounded. Dividing by ρν,k, we see that
αk
ρν,k
=
1
ρν,k
∇xνθν(xk+1) +∇xνgν(xk+1)
(
uν,k
ρν,k
+ gν(xk+1)
)
+
+∇xνhν(xk+1)µ
ν,k+1
ρν,k
approaches zero. For every i with gνi (x) < 0, we have (u
ν,k
i /ρν,k + g
ν
i (x
k+1))+ = 0 for
sufficiently large k ∈ K. Hence, we obtain
∑
gν
i
(x)≥0
max
{
0,
uν,ki
ρν,k
+ gνi (x
k+1)
}
∇xνgνi (xk+1) +∇xνhν(xk+1)
µν,k+1
ρν,k
→ 0.
Since uν,ki /ρν,k → 0 by the boundedness of (uν,k), this implies that
(17)
∑
gν
i
(x)≥0
gνi (x
k+1)∇xνgνi (xk+1) +∇xνhν(xk+1)
µν,k+1
ρν,k
→ 0.
Let us define
Iν(x) :=
{
i | gνi (x) ≥ 0
}
, Iν(xk+1) :=
{
i | gνi (xk+1) ≥ 0
}
.
Then Iν(xk+1) ⊆ Iν(x) for all k ∈ K sufficiently large. Furthermore, let
µˆν,k+1 :=
µν,k+1
ρν,k
∀k ∈ K.
Then Assumption 12 immediately shows that the second part of (16) holds. Further-
more, the first part also holds since
∇xν 1
2
∥∥gν+(xk+1)∥∥2 +∇xνhν(xk+1)µˆν,k+1
=
∑
i∈Iν(xk+1)
gνi (x
k+1)∇xνgνi (xk+1) +∇xνhν(xk+1)µˆν,k+1
=
∑
i∈Iν(x)
gνi (x
k+1)∇xνgνi (xk+1) +∇xνhν(xk+1)µˆν,k+1
︸ ︷︷ ︸
→K0 by (17)
−
∑
i∈Iν(x)\Iν(xk+1)
gνi (x
k+1)∇xνgνi (xk+1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
→K0 since gνi (x)=0
→K 0.
This completes the proof.
Clearly, (16) is an approximate KKT condition which we have already encountered
in Theorems 6 and 7. This immediately yields the following corollary.
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Corollary 14. Let (xk) be generated by Algorithm 11 under Assumption 12, x¯
be a limit point of (xk) and assume that, for every ν, the function hν satisfies CPLDν
in x¯. Then x¯ is a KKT point of the Feasibility GNEP (15).
Proof. This is a direct consequence of Lemma 13 and Theorem 6.
The above results establish the aforementioned connection between Algorithm 11 and
the Feasibility GNEP. Hence, it is natural to ask for the solution set of this auxiliary
problem. Clearly, every feasible point of the original GNEP is a solution of (15),
since the objective functions are zero. The converse is not true, in general, unless
we assume some regularity conditions. The most important example is given in the
following theorem.
Theorem 15. Let x¯ be a KKT point of the Feasibility GNEP and assume that
the original GNEP satisfies GNEP-EMFCQ in x¯. Then we have gν(x¯) ≤ 0 for every
ν, i.e., x¯ is feasible for the GNEP from (10); in particular, x¯ is a solution of the
Feasibility GNEP (15).
Proof. Assume that there is a ν ∈ {1, . . . , N} and an ℓ ∈ {1, . . . ,mν} such that
gνℓ (x¯) > 0. By assumption, there are multipliers w
ν ∈ Rpν such that
∇xν‖gν+(x¯)‖2 +∇xνhν(x¯)wν = 0 and min{−hν(x¯), wν} = 0
holds. After removing some vanishing terms, we obtain
2
∑
gν
i
(x¯)>0
gνi (x¯)∇xνgνi (x¯) +
∑
hν
j
(x¯)=0
wνj∇xνhνj (x¯) = 0.
Premultiplication of this equation with dν , where dν is the vector from GNEP-EMFCQ,
yields a contradiction.
The above theorem shows that our convergence theory naturally comprises GNEP-
EMFCQ. Of course, we could easily have carried out our analysis without even con-
sidering the (weaker) GNEP-CPLD. However, we believe that the theorems above
together with the Feasibility GNEP most clearly explain the structure and behaviour
of Algorithm 11, especially with regard to our GNEP-tailored constraint qualifica-
tions.
Another interesting case in which the Feasibility GNEP has some structural prop-
erties is the following, which covers, as a special case, the jointly-convex GNEP. As-
sume that the functions gν describe a shared constraint (which we denote by g) and
that hν is a function of xν only. Furthermore, assume that both g and hν are convex.
Hence, player ν’s optimization problem takes the form
(18) min
xν
θν(x) s.t. g(x) ≤ 0, hν(xν) ≤ 0.
For such GNEPs, we can prove the following theorem which makes the same asser-
tion as Theorem 15. Note, however, that we do not require any further constraint
qualifications, particularly for the function g.
Theorem 16. Consider a GNEP of the form (18) with g, hν being convex, and
assume that the GNEP has feasible points. Then, if x¯ is a KKT point of the corre-
sponding Feasibility GNEP, we have g(x¯) ≤ 0, i.e. x¯ is feasible for (18).
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Proof. Since x¯ is a KKT point of the Feasibility GNEP, there are multipliers wν
such that
∇xν‖g+(x¯)‖2 +∇hν(x¯ν)wν = 0 and min{−hν(x¯ν), wν} = 0
for every ν. Hence, x¯ together with w = (w1, . . . , wN ) is a KKT point of the opti-
mization problem
min ‖g+(x)‖2 s.t. h1(x1) ≤ 0, . . . , hN (xN ) ≤ 0.
Note that this is a convex optimization problem. Hence the KKT point is a global
minimum of this minimization problem. By assumption, however, the feasible set of
(18) is nonempty. This implies that g+(x¯) = 0, hence the assertion follows.
The results in this section have shown that Algorithm 11 does (in some sense) tend
to achieve feasibility. However, it should be noted that our analysis does not exclude
the possibility of the sequence (xk) converging to an infeasible point. For instance,
the Feasibility GNEP could have solutions which are not feasible for (10). This is
particularly plausible if GNEP-EMFCQ is not satisfied or the constraint functions gν,
hν are not convex.
4.2. Optimality. We proceed by discussing the optimality of limit points of
Algorithm 11 applied to the general GNEP from (10). To this end, we recall Assump-
tion 12. If we assume εk → 0, the assumption can be stated as
∇xνLνa(xk+1, uν,k; ρν,k) +∇xνhν(xk+1)µν,k+1 → 0,
min{−hν(xk+1), µν,k+1} → 0.
By expanding the augmented Lagrangian, we obtain
(19) ∇xνθν(xk+1) +∇xνgν(xk+1)λν,k+1 +∇xνhν(xk+1)µν,k+1 → 0,
which already suggests that the sequence xk satisfies an approximate KKT condition
for the GNEP (10). In fact, we can prove the following lemma.
Lemma 17. Let (xk) be a sequence generated by Algorithm 11 under Assump-
tion 12, where εk ↓ 0, and let x¯ be a limit point of (xk) on some subsequence K ⊂ N.
If x¯ is feasible, we have
∇xνθν(xk) +∇xνgν(xk)λν,k +∇xνhν(xk)µν,k →K 0
min{−gν(xk), λν,k} →K 0, min{−hν(xk), µν,k} →K 0.
for every ν.
Proof. We only need to prove the second assertion. To this end, let ν and i be
given indices such that gνi (x¯) < 0. If (ρν,k) is bounded, (14) implies that λ
ν,k
i →K 0.
On the other hand, if (ρν,k) is unbounded, the updating scheme in (13) also implies
λν,k →K 0.
The above theorem shows that, barring the feasibility of x¯, the sequence (xk)K satisfies
the approximate KKT conditions from Theorem 6. Hence, we can use this fact to
prove the optimality theorem below. Note that we need to explicitly assume the
feasibility of x¯. In some cases, this is not necessary – consider, for instance, the
setting of Theorem 15, where we have GNEP-EMFCQ.
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Theorem 18. Let (xk) be a sequence generated by Algorithm 11 under Assump-
tion 12, where εk ↓ 0, and let x¯ be a limit point of (xk). Assume that one of the
following conditions is satisfied:
(a) x¯ is feasible and GNEP-CPLD holds in x¯.
(b) GNEP-EMFCQ holds in x¯.
Then x¯ is a KKT point of the GNEP.
Proof. First assume that (a) holds. Since x¯ is feasible, we can apply Lemma 17
and obtain a sequence of approximate KKT points for the GNEP from (10). The
statement then follows from Theorem 6 by using the fact that we have cν =
(
gν , hν
)
.
Next consider case (b). Since GNEP-EMFCQ implies GNEP-CPLD, it follows
that, for each player ν, CPLDν holds for c
ν = (gν , hν). This, by definition, yields that,
for each ν = 1, . . . , N , CPLDν holds for h
ν . Hence Corollary 14 shows that x¯ is a
KKT point of the Feasibility GNEP (15). Consequently, we obtain from Theorem 15
that x¯ is feasible for the GNEP (10). Then we can proceed as in part (a).
Note that, despite Lemma 17, the multipliers λ and µ which make x¯ a KKT point
are not necessarily limit points of the sequences (λk) and (µk). This is a consequence
of GNEP-CPLD, see Theorem 6. However, we do get this property if we assume
GNEP-EMFCQ instead, see Theorem 7.
Finally, without proof, we would like to briefly mention another kind of conver-
gence theorem one can easily show for Algorithm 11. In the above results, we have
usually required that the sequence (xk) has a limit point. If we make the (much
stronger) assumption that the sequence of triples (xk, λk, µk) has a limit point, we
obtain the following theorem which does not require any constraint qualifications.
Theorem 19. Let (xk), (λk) and (µk) be the sequences generated by Algorithm 11
under Assumption 12, where εk ↓ 0. Then every limit point of the sequence of triples
(xk, λk, µk) is a KKT point of the GNEP.
5. Computing Variational Equilibria. We have already seen that Algorithm 11
possesses some particular convergence properties for jointly-convex GNEPs – consider,
for instance, Theorem 16. In this section, we present a modified method which is tai-
lored towards the computation of variational (or normalized) equilibria, cf. [12, 17, 27].
To this end, we perform an obvious change in notation and consider a GNEP of the
form
(20) min
xν
θν(x) s.t. g(x) ≤ 0, h(x) ≤ 0
with smooth functions g : Rn → Rm and h : Rn → Rp whose components are assumed
to be convex. Hence, all players share the same constraints. The most straightforward
modification of Algorithm 11 is to simply choose the same iteration parameters
τν , γν , ρν,0, λ
ν,0, uν,0, and µν,0
for every player ν. Looking at the updating scheme in Algorithm 11, this implies
that the corresponding parameters uν,k, λν,k, and ρν,k will remain independent of ν
throughout – something which is clearly desirable when computing variational equi-
libria. For the sake of simplicity, we can now drop the index ν altogether and simply
refer to the parameters as uk, λk, ρk, and so on. This prompts us to restate the
algorithm as follows.
Algorithm 20. (Augmented Lagrangian method for variational equilibria)
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(S.0) Let umax ≥ 0, τ ∈ (0, 1), γ > 1 and ρ0 > 0. Choose x0 ∈ Rn, λ0 ∈ Rm,
µ0 ∈ Rp, u0 ∈ [0, umax]m, and set k := 0.
(S.1) If (xk, λk, µk) is an approximate KKT point of the GNEP: STOP.
(S.2) Compute an approximate KKT point (xk+1, µk+1) of the GNEP consisting of
the minimization problems
(21) min
xν
Lνa(x, u
k; ρk) s.t. h(x) ≤ 0
for each player ν = 1, . . . , N .
(S.3) Update the vector of multipliers to
(22) λk+1 =
(
uk + ρkg
ν(xk+1)
)
+
.
(S.4) If
(23)
∥∥min{−g(xk+1), λk+1}∥∥ ≤ τ∥∥min{−g(xk), λk}∥∥,
then set ρk+1 := ρk. Else, set ρk+1 := γρk.
(S.5) Set uk+1 = min{λk+1, umax}, k ← k + 1, and go to (S.1).
Clearly, Algorithm 20 is nothing but a special instance of Algorithm 11. Hence, the
convergence theory established in Section 4 remains valid. However, we can use the
fact that we have unified sequences (for both multipliers and penalty parameters) to
prove different convergence theorems. Before we do so, we should revisit the sub-
problems which occur in Step 2. With the understanding that we are looking for
variational equilibria, it is natural to make the following assumption.
Assumption 21. At Step 2 of Algorithm 20, we obtain xk+1 ∈ Rn and µk+1 ∈ Rp
with ∥∥∇xνLνa(xk+1, uk; ρk) +∇xνh(xk+1)µk+1∥∥ ≤ εk
‖min{−h(xk+1), µk+1}‖ ≤ ε′k
for every ν. Here, (εk) ⊂ R+ is bounded and (ε′k) ⊂ R+ tends to zero.
Note that Assumption 21 is, essentially, a refined version of Assumption 12. The key
difference is that µk is independent of the player index ν.
We now turn to a brief convergence analysis for Algorithm 20. To this end,
recall that we have used the GNEP-CPLD constraint qualification for an analysis of
Algorithm 11. Furthermore, the discussion in Section 2 shows that, in general, this
is a condition which is independent of CPLD. Despite this fact, it turns out that we
can use the classical CPLD as a constraint qualification for Algorithm 20.
Theorem 22. Let (xk) be generated by Algorithm 20 under Assumption 21, let
x¯ be a limit point of (xk) and assume that h satisfies CPLD in x¯. Then x¯ is a global
solution of
(24) min ‖g+(x)‖2 s.t. h(x) ≤ 0.
In particular, if there are feasible points, then x¯ is feasible.
Proof. Since g and h are assumed to be convex, it suffices to show that x¯ is a
KKT point of (24). To verify this, we can proceed as in the proof of Lemma 13 and
obtain a sequence (µˆk) of multipliers such that
∇xν‖g+(xk)‖2 +∇xνh(xk)µˆk →K 0 and min{−h(xk), µˆk} →K 0
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for every ν, where K ⊂ N is some appropriate subsequence (note that the proof of
Lemma 13 shows that we can choose the same multipliers for each player). This
implies
∇‖g+(xk)‖2 +∇h(xk)µˆk →K 0 and min{−h(xk), µˆk} →K 0.
Since CPLD holds, we may assume without loss of generality that the sequence {µˆk}
is bounded. Subsequencing if necessary, we can therefore assume that µˆk →K µ¯ for
some vector µ¯ ∈ Rp. It then follows that (x¯, µ¯) is a KKT point of (24). Since this is a
convex program and there exist feasible points by assumption, the statement follows.
The proof of Theorem 22 clearly shows that we need the multipliers µˆk to be inde-
pendent of ν, a property which, in general, does not hold for the iterates generated
by Algorithm 11. On the other hand, we do not require a special structure for the
function h. In this sense, the theorem is actually much stronger than Theorem 16.
We proceed by stating an optimality result akin to Theorem 18. Note that we do
not need to explicitly assume the feasibility of the limit point because of Theorem 22.
Theorem 23. Let (xk) be generated by Algorithm 20 and x¯ be a limit point of
(xk). If (xk) satisfies Assumption 21, the constraints g and h permit feasible points
and the function
x 7→
(
g(x)
h(x)
)
satisfies CPLD in x¯, then x¯ is feasible and solves the GNEP.
Proof. Under the given assumptions, it is clear that h itself also satisfies CPLD.
Hence, by Theorem 22, x¯ is feasible. Furthermore, Lemma 17 gives us the asymptotic
conditions
∇xνθν(xk) +∇xνg(xk)λk +∇xνh(xk)µk →K 0
min{−g(xk), λk} →K 0, min{−h(xk), µk} →K 0.
for every ν. The result then follows by concatenating these systems for every ν and
using CPLD.
The above results are particularly interesting because the classical CPLD is a more
amenable condition than GNEP-CPLD. For example, we have the well-known chain
of implications Slater =⇒ MFCQ =⇒ CPLD, which allows us to use the (easily
verifiable) Slater condition as a CQ for jointly-convex GNEPs.
Before we conclude this section, we would like to point out another property of
Algorithm 20. The augmented Lagrangian for player ν is given by
Lνa(x, u; ρ) = θν(x) +
ρ
2
∥∥∥∥∥
(
g(x) +
u
ρ
)
+
∥∥∥∥∥
2
.
Clearly, the second term is independent of ν. This allows us to decompose the aug-
mented Lagrangian in the following way:
Lνa(x, u; ρ) = θν(x) + P (x, u; ρ),
where P is a convex penalty term which is independent of ν. This decomposition is
useful when designing methods for the solution of the subproblems. For instance, it
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is well-known that a critical property of (jointly-convex) GNEPs is the monotonicity
of the function
F (x) =

 ∇x
1θ1(x)
...
∇xN θN (x)

 .
When adding a convex penalty term to the functions θν , it is easy to see that this
property is preserved.
6. Implementation and Numerical Results. In this section, we present some
empirical results to showcase the convergence of our method(s). To this end, we
implement Algorithm 11 in MATLAB R© and, for the sake of simplicity, we solve every
problem by performing a full penalization. This is especially attractive because many
of the convergence theorems (e.g. 14 and 16) hold without any further assumptions.
The test suite we use is identical to the one from [13]. For every problem, we use
the same parameters umax = 106 and ρν,0 = 1 for every ν. The remaining parameters
are chosen depending on the size of the problem:
τν = 0.1, γν = 10, if n ≤ 100;
τν = 0.5, γν = 2, if n > 100.
This represents a quite aggressive penalization for small problems and a more cautious
scheme for large problems. We have found this distinction to be very efficient for our
problem set. For the computation of the initial multipliers λν,0 (and uν,0, which we
set to the same value), we recall the KKT conditions for player ν, which can be stated
as
∇xνθν(x0) +∇xνgν(x0)λν,0 = 0 and min{−gν(x0), λν,0} = 0.
We now solve the first condition in a least-squares sense by setting λν,0i = 0 for
every i with gνi (x
0) < 0 and using the MATLAB R© function lsqnonneg to compute a
nonnegative least-squares solution of
∇xνθν(x0) +∇xνgν(x0)λν,0 = 0.
Finally, the overall stopping criterion we use is
‖∇xνθν(x) +∇xνgν(x)λν‖∞ ≤ ε, ‖gν+(x)‖∞ ≤ ε, and |gν(x)T λν | ≤ ε
for every ν. Here, ε is some prescribed stopping tolerance which we set to 10−8.
6.1. Solution of the subproblems. Since we perform a full penalization, the
subproblems which occur at Step 2 of Algorithm 11 are unconstrained NEPs where
player ν’s optimization problem is given by
min
xν
Lνa(x, u
ν,k; ρν,k).
Hence, we simply solve these problems by considering the nonlinear equation
(25) F (x) =

 ∇x
1L1a(x, u
1,k; ρ1,k)
...
∇xNLNa (x, uN,k; ρN,k)

 != 0.
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In principle, we could use any general-purpose nonlinear equation solver to solve
this equation. However, it should be noted that F is, in general, a semismooth
function with non-isolated solutions. Hence, special care needs to be taken when
selecting an algorithm. For instance, the classical semismooth Newton method [23, 25]
typically does not exhibit (locally) superlinear convergence for such problems, whereas
more sophisticated methods such as Levenberg-Marquardt methods [16, 29] or the LP-
Newton method [9] are known to be more efficient under certain assumptions. For
our numerical testing, we decided to employ a Levenberg-Marquardt type algorithm
from [16] where the basic step d is given by(
J(x)T J(x) + α(x)I
)
d = −J(x)TF (x).
Here, J(x) is some suitable (generalized) Jacobian of F and α(x) = ‖F (x)‖. In
order to improve the global convergence properties of this method, we have decided
to combine it with a classical Levenberg-Marquardt parameter updating scheme, i.e.
we consider the equation(
J(x)T J(x) + α‖F (x)‖I) d = −J(x)TF (x)
and iteratively update α (in a heuristic manner) based on the success of the last step.
A precise statement of the algorithm is as follows.
Algorithm 24. (Levenberg-Marquardt type method for F )
(S.0) Let x0 ∈ Rn, α0 = 1, ε > 0, and set k = 0.
(S.1) If ‖F (xk)‖ ≤ ε holds: STOP.
(S.2) Choose Vk ∈ ∂F (xk) and compute dk by solving
(26) (V Tk Vk + αk‖F (xk)‖I)dk = −V Tk F (xk).
If ‖F (xk + dk)‖ < ‖F (xk)‖, set αk+1 = 0.1αk and go to (S.4).
(S.3) Iteratively set αk ← 10αk and re-compute dk as given by (26) until ‖F (xk +
dk)‖ < ‖F (xk)‖. Finally, set αk+1 = αk.
(S.4) Set xk+1 = xk + dk, k ← k + 1, and go to (S.1).
Note that we use the same tolerance ε = 10−8 as given at the beginning of this section.
Furthermore, since F is only semismooth, the above is not a globally convergent
algorithm. In fact, the loop in (S.3) does not necessarily terminate finitely if the
current point xk is one where F is not differentiable. To safeguard against this case,
we terminate the loop in (S.3) if
‖d‖ < ε‖V k‖F .
Despite the necessity of such safeguarding techniques, we have found the above method
to be sufficient for nearly all our examples.
6.2. Numerical Results. We now present our results. For a given problem, N
denotes the number of players, n is the total number of variables, k is the number of
outer iterations, itotal is the accumulated number of inner iterations and F denotes a
failure. We also include certain values which measure the feasiblity, optimality and
complementarity at the solution. These are denoted Rf , Ro and Rc, respectively. The
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values are calculated as follows:
Rf = max
ν=1,...,N
‖gν+(x)‖∞
Ro = max
ν=1,...,N
‖∇xνθν(x) +∇xνgν(x)λν‖∞
Rc = max
ν=1,...,N
|gν(x)Tλν |.
Clearly, some remarks are in order:
1. With the exception of problem A.8, the augmented Lagrangian method was
able to solve every problem quite efficiently. It is particularly noteworthy that
the method achieves a very high accuracy, typically in the region of 10−10.
This compares quite favourably to other methods for GNEPs, such as the
interior-point method from [7] or the exact penalty method from [13].
2. We have also tried the algorithm with different choices of umax. Recall that,
for umax = 0, the algorithm is essentially a quadratic penalty method. The
following table lists some values for umax and corresponding failure numbers.
umax 0 10 102 104 106
failures 29 18 10 1 1
3. For most problems, the stopping accuracy tends to have little effect on the
speed of the algorithm. A notable exception is problem A.2, where we ob-
served significantly lower (by a factor of 3) iteration numbers when using a
tolerance of 10−4. We suspect that this is a consequence of the very narrow
feasible set in this problem (see [13]).
4. Clearly, the overall speed of the algorithm crucially depends on how quickly
the subproblems are solved. In this regard, the Levenberg-Marquardt algo-
rithm seems to greatly benefit from the (semi-)smoothness of the function
F from (25). We investigated some of the problems on a sample basis and
found that the Levenberg-Marquardt method appears to be superlinearly con-
vergent for all of them. Despite this, we believe that there is a lot of room
for improvement here.
5. Another factor which greatly affects the performance of the algorithm is the
choice of the parameters which handle the multipliers and penalty parameters.
In this regard, our choices are quite simple and straightforward. However,
for some problems, we observed that fine-tuning the parameters can yield a
significant speed improvement.
6. For problem A.8 with the starting point x0 = 0, the subproblem algorithm is
unable to compute a solution and, hence, the overall iteration breaks down.
Another peculiarity of problem A.8 is that, for a suitable choice of parameters,
one can get the algorithm to converge to the infeasible point x¯ = (1.5, 0, 2).
This point (together with its corresponding multipliers) satisfies the stationar-
ity part of the KKT conditions, but (due to the infeasibility) is not a solution
of the GNEP. Furthermore, one can easily verify that x¯ is a solution of the
Feasibility GNEP (15), as suggested by Corollary 14, but GNEP-EMFCQ
does not hold in x¯. This shows that the assertions of Corollary 14 can, in
general, not be sharpened.
7. Final Remarks. We have introduced an augmented Lagrangian method for
the solution of generalized Nash equilibrium problems. Our method is quite flexible
in the sense that it allows partial penalization of constraints and can be modified for
the computation of variational equilibria of jointly-convex GNEPs. The numerical
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Table 1
Numerical results for Algorithm 11.
Example N n x0 k itotal Rf Ro Rc ρmax
A.1 10 10 0.01 7 20 1.5e-10 8.9e-16 4.2e-11 100
0.1 6 13 8e-09 5.9e-13 2.1e-09 100
1 7 19 1.5e-10 2.9e-16 4.2e-11 100
A.2 10 10 0.01 9 108 4.7e-09 2.3e-09 1.4e-09 1000
0.1 8 70 2.9e-09 4.1e-14 2.9e-11 100
1 10 192 4.9e-10 5.6e-14 1.5e-10 1e+05
A.3 3 7 0 1 4 0 1e-09 0 1
1 1 5 0 3.6e-15 0 1
10 1 5 0 1.7e-10 0 1
A.4 3 7 0 12 63 2.6e-11 1.5e-09 2.6e-09 1e+04
1 0 0 0 0 0 1
10 11 202 2.5e-12 4.6e-10 7.4e-10 1e+04
A.5 3 7 0 8 20 2e-10 1.7e-13 4.8e-10 1000
1 8 20 3.5e-10 4.9e-13 8.3e-10 1000
10 10 27 6.9e-09 1e-13 6.2e-09 1000
A.6 3 7 0 14 68 1.9e-11 6.6e-10 4.2e-09 1e+04
1 11 92 9.8e-12 4.5e-09 5.1e-09 1e+04
10 14 82 1.9e-11 6.6e-10 4.2e-09 1e+04
A.7 4 20 0 13 35 6.6e-12 1.7e-11 2.3e-09 1e+04
1 12 39 1.1e-11 1.4e-11 3.8e-09 1e+04
10 12 52 4.1e-12 1.2e-11 1.7e-09 1e+05
A.8 3 3 0 F
1 1 4 4.9e-11 4.9e-11 4.9e-11 1
10 3 14 4.5e-12 4.9e-12 4.5e-12 10
A.9a 7 56 0 9 46 2.3e-09 8e-15 7.6e-09 10
A.9b 7 112 0 26 75 2.8e-10 1e-14 2.7e-09 16
A.10a 8 24 see [13] 11 243 9.8e-13 4.5e-11 4.5e-12 1e+05
A.10b 25 125 see [13] 19 2519 6.7e-10 1.8e-11 4.9e-09 64
A.10c 37 222 see [13] 40 3658 7.2e-13 9.3e-12 1.6e-09 5e+05
A.10d 37 370 see [13] 19 2527 2.9e-11 2.3e-12 3.1e-10 256
A.10e 48 576 see [13] 18 4048 1.2e-10 7.1e-12 1.5e-09 256
A.11 2 2 0 9 17 6.4e-09 2.9e-15 3.2e-09 10
A.12 2 2 (2,0) 1 5 0 8.9e-16 0 1
A.13 3 3 0 4 20 3.3e-09 7.6e-12 1.9e-09 1
A.14 10 10 0.01 1 8 0 8.2e-14 0 1
A.15 3 6 0 1 7 0 2.8e-14 0 1
A.16a 5 5 10 10 26 1.3e-10 6e-14 3.7e-09 10
A.16b 5 5 10 9 26 6.1e-11 3.6e-15 1.1e-09 10
A.16c 5 5 10 7 23 9e-10 1.5e-13 6.4e-09 10
A.16d 5 5 10 9 24 4e-09 2.1e-14 1.9e-09 1
A.17 2 3 0 8 20 4.5e-11 3.4e-13 1.1e-10 100
A.18 2 12 0 9 34 1.3e-11 1.1e-11 2.4e-10 1000
1 9 34 1.3e-11 1.2e-11 2.4e-10 1000
10 9 32 1.3e-11 1.8e-11 2.4e-10 1000
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testing we have done indicates that the method works quite well in practice, since it
possesses good global convergence properties and easily achieves a very high accuracy,
provided the problem is sufficiently well-behaved.
It should be noted that there are still many aspects which might lead to substan-
tial numerical improvements. Aside from the fine-tuning of iteration parameters, a
more detailed analysis of the subproblems which occur in our method might lead to
insights on their solution. In this regard, it would be interesting to analyse whether
the subproblems satisfy certain regularity conditions such as an error-bound to the so-
lution set [6, 19] or how other methods such as smoothing Newton methods [23] could
be incorporated into the solution process. Further possible extensions of the ALM
are second-order multiplier iterations or approaches such as the exponential method
of multipliers, cf. [3].
On another note, the theoretical analysis of our algorithm has uncovered a series
of properties and concepts which extend the rich theoretical background of augmented
Lagrangian methods to the field of GNEPs. For instance, the constraint qualifications
introduced in Section 2 (one of which has previously been used in the literature) are
very general and hence, we hope, they will find applications in the context of other
methods for multi-player games.
The same goes for our notion of the Feasibility GNEP, which is a new optimality
concept for GNEPs that offers a very clear insight on the behaviour of the augmented
Lagrangian method. This is a generalization of a corresponding concept for classical
optimization problems, cf. [4], which has enjoyed a variety of applications, e.g. in
the context of Sequential Quadratic Programming (SQP) methods in [5]. A natural
continuation of this idea would be an SQP-type method for GNEPs, which we envision
as a possible path for future research.
REFERENCES
[1] R. Andreani, G. Haeser, M. L. Schuverdt, and P. J. S. Silva, A relaxed con-
stant positive linear dependence constraint qualification and applications, Math. Pro-
gram., 135 (2012), pp. 255–273, doi:10.1007/s10107-011-0456-0, http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/
s10107-011-0456-0.
[2] A. Bensoussan, Points de Nash dans le cas de fonctionnelles quadratiques et jeux diffe´rentiels
line´aires a` N personnes, SIAM J. Control, 12 (1974), pp. 460–499.
[3] D. P. Bertsekas, Constrained optimization and Lagrange multiplier methods, Computer Sci-
ence and Applied Mathematics, Academic Press, Inc. [Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Publish-
ers], New York-London, 1982.
[4] E. G. Birgin and J. M. Mart´ınez, Practical augmented Lagrangian methods for constrained
optimization, vol. 10 of Fundamentals of Algorithms, Society for Industrial and Applied
Mathematics (SIAM), Philadelphia, PA, 2014, doi:10.1137/1.9781611973365, http://dx.doi.
org/10.1137/1.9781611973365.
[5] J. V. Burke and S.-P. Han, A robust sequential quadratic programming method, Math. Pro-
gramming, 43 (1989), pp. 277–303, doi:10.1007/BF01582294, http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/
BF01582294.
[6] A. Dreves, F. Facchinei, A. Fischer, and M. Herrich, A new error bound result for
generalized Nash equilibrium problems and its algorithmic application, Comput. Optim.
Appl., 59 (2014), pp. 63–84, doi:10.1007/s10589-013-9586-z, http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/
s10589-013-9586-z.
[7] A. Dreves, F. Facchinei, C. Kanzow, and S. Sagratella, On the solution of the KKT
conditions of generalized Nash equilibrium problems, SIAM J. Optim., 21 (2011), pp. 1082–
1108, doi:10.1137/100817000, http://dx.doi.org/10.1137/100817000.
[8] A. Dreves, C. Kanzow, and O. Stein, Nonsmooth optimization reformulations of player
convex generalized Nash equilibrium problems, J. Global Optim., 53 (2012), pp. 587–614,
doi:10.1007/s10898-011-9727-9, http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10898-011-9727-9.
[9] F. Facchinei, A. Fischer, and M. Herrich, An LP-Newton method: nonsmooth equa-
24
tions, KKT systems, and nonisolated solutions, Math. Program., 146 (2014), pp. 1–36,
doi:10.1007/s10107-013-0676-6, http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10107-013-0676-6.
[10] F. Facchinei, A. Fischer, and V. Piccialli, On generalized Nash games and variational
inequalities, Oper. Res. Lett., 35 (2007), pp. 159–164, doi:10.1016/j.orl.2006.03.004, http://
dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2006.03.004.
[11] F. Facchinei, A. Fischer, and V. Piccialli, Generalized Nash equilibrium problems and
Newton methods, Math. Program., 117 (2009), pp. 163–194, doi:10.1007/s10107-007-0160-2,
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10107-007-0160-2.
[12] F. Facchinei and C. Kanzow, Generalized Nash equilibrium problems, Ann. Oper.
Res., 175 (2010), pp. 177–211, doi:10.1007/s10479-009-0653-x, http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/
s10479-009-0653-x.
[13] F. Facchinei and C. Kanzow, Penalty methods for the solution of generalized Nash equilibrium
problems, SIAM J. Optim., 20 (2010), pp. 2228–2253, doi:10.1137/090749499, http://dx.
doi.org/10.1137/090749499.
[14] F. Facchinei and L. Lampariello, Partial penalization for the solution of gen-
eralized Nash equilibrium problems, J. Global Optim., 50 (2011), pp. 39–57,
doi:10.1007/s10898-010-9579-8, http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10898-010-9579-8.
[15] F. Facchinei and J.-S. Pang, Finite-dimensional variational inequalities and complementarity
problems. Vol. II, Springer Series in Operations Research, Springer-Verlag, New York, 2003.
[16] J.-y. Fan and Y.-x. Yuan, On the quadratic convergence of the Levenberg-Marquardt
method without nonsingularity assumption, Computing, 74 (2005), pp. 23–39,
doi:10.1007/s00607-004-0083-1, http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00607-004-0083-1.
[17] A. Fischer, M. Herrich, and K. Scho¨nefeld, Generalized nash equilibrium problems - recent
advances and challenges, Pesquisa Operacional, 34 (2014), pp. 521 – 558, http://www.scielo.
br/scielo.php?script=sci arttext&pid=S0101-74382014000300521&nrm=iso.
[18] M. Fukushima, Restricted generalized Nash equilibria and controlled penalty algorithm, Com-
put. Manag. Sci., 8 (2011), pp. 201–218, doi:10.1007/s10287-009-0097-4, http://dx.doi.org/
10.1007/s10287-009-0097-4.
[19] A. F. Izmailov and M. V. Solodov, On error bounds and Newton-type methods for gen-
eralized Nash equilibrium problems, Comput. Optim. Appl., 59 (2014), pp. 201–218,
doi:10.1007/s10589-013-9595-y, http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10589-013-9595-y.
[20] C. Kanzow, On the multiplier-penalty-approach for quasi-variational inequalities, Mathemat-
ical Programming, (2016), pp. 1–31, doi:10.1007/s10107-015-0973-3, http://dx.doi.org/10.
1007/s10107-015-0973-3.
[21] J. Nocedal and S. J. Wright, Numerical optimization, Springer Series in Operations Research
and Financial Engineering, Springer, New York, second ed., 2006.
[22] J.-S. Pang and M. Fukushima, Quasi-variational inequalities, generalized Nash equi-
libria, and multi-leader-follower games, Comput. Manag. Sci., 2 (2005), pp. 21–56,
doi:10.1007/s10287-004-0010-0, http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10287-004-0010-0.
[23] L. Qi and D. Sun, A survey of some nonsmooth equations and smoothing Newton meth-
ods, in Progress in optimization, vol. 30 of Appl. Optim., Kluwer Acad. Publ., Dor-
drecht, 1999, pp. 121–146, doi:10.1007/978-1-4613-3285-5 7, http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/
978-1-4613-3285-5 7.
[24] L. Qi and Z. Wei, On the constant positive linear dependence condition and its ap-
plication to SQP methods, SIAM J. Optim., 10 (2000), pp. 963–981 (electronic),
doi:10.1137/S1052623497326629, http://dx.doi.org/10.1137/S1052623497326629.
[25] L. Q. Qi and J. Sun, A nonsmooth version of Newton’s method, Math. Programming, 58
(1993), pp. 353–367, doi:10.1007/BF01581275, http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01581275.
[26] R. T. Rockafellar, Augmented Lagrange multiplier functions and duality in nonconvex pro-
gramming, SIAM J. Control, 12 (1974), pp. 268–285. Collection of articles dedicated to
the memory of Lucien W. Neustadt.
[27] J. B. Rosen, Existence and uniqueness of equilibrium points for concave n-person games,
Econometrica, 33 (1965), pp. 520–534.
[28] A. von Heusinger and C. Kanzow, Optimization reformulations of the general-
ized Nash equilibrium problem using Nikaido-Isoda-type functions, Comput. Optim.
Appl., 43 (2009), pp. 353–377, doi:10.1007/s10589-007-9145-6, http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/
s10589-007-9145-6.
[29] N. Yamashita and M. Fukushima, On the rate of convergence of the Levenberg-Marquardt
method, in Topics in numerical analysis, vol. 15 of Comput. Suppl., Springer, Vi-
enna, 2001, pp. 239–249, doi:10.1007/978-3-7091-6217-0 18, http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/
978-3-7091-6217-0 18.
25
